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Sir Karl Popper (1902–1994), though nottrained as a physicist and embarrassed earlyin his career by a physics error pointed out by
Einstein and Bohr, ultimately made substantial con-
tributions to the interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics. As was often the case, Popper initially formu-
lated his position by criticizing the views of others –
in this case Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg. Un-
derlying Popper’s criticism was his belief that, first,
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics abandoned scientific realism and second, the as-
sertion that quantum theory was complete (an asser-
tion rejected by Einstein among others) amounted
to an unfalsifiable claim. Popper insisted that the
most basic predictions of quantum mechanics should
continue to be tested, with an eye towards falsifica-
tion rather than mere adding of decimal places to
confirmatory experiments. His persistent attacks on
the Copenhagen interpretation were aimed not at the
uncertainty principle itself and the formalism from
which it was derived, but at the acceptance by physi-
cists of an unclear epistemology and ontology that left
critical questions unanswered.
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1 Popper in the physics journals
Sir Karl Popper, by any measure one of the preeminent
philosophers of the twentieth century, died in 1994 at the
age of 92. He was productive to the end, publishing in
the year of his death a criticism of Kuhn’s incommensu-
rability of paradigms [1]. That debate continues over his
many and profound philosophical ideas and opinions is
hardly surprising, almost two decades after his death. The
proliferation of book-length biographies and scholarly
philosophical articles is testimony to Popper’s standing as
a philosopher [2–5]. Major conferences are also regularly
held on the thought of Karl Popper [6, 7].
It may come as a surprise, however, that beginning
in the year 2000, Popper’s name appears prominently in
no less than a dozen papers in the journals of theoretical
physics, in the majority of cases in the paper’s title [8–20].
Several of these papers report the results of Popper’s
experiment carried out by physicists at the University
of Maryland in 1999 [13–17]. Coincidentally, the final
section of a recent text on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) paradox in physics deals with this same experi-
ment, proposed by Popper in the early 1980’s [21, Sec.
5.4.3]. How is it that physicists in the new millennium are
invoking Karl Popper’s name, conducting experiments
suggested by him, and arguing over the meaning of the
results?
To suggest answers to this question, I review below
Popper’s fifty years of contributions to the interpretation
of quantum mechanics. For reasons that will become clear
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in later sections of the paper, I trace a line of thought ex-
periments that Popper proposed to test his own views
against the views of the majority of theoretical physicists
who created quantum mechanics. In the final section of
the paper, I offer a possible explanation for why Pop-
per’s passionately-held opinions continue to attract the
attention of physicists, and are worthy of that attention.
2 ‘Logik Der Forschung’ and
Einstein’s refutation
The most exciting and fundamental discoveries of quan-
tum mechanics were made while Popper was in college
and graduate school. Though his dissertation was not
in physics, he had studied the sciences and mathematics
and was qualified to teach them on the secondary level.
The thesis, completed in 1928, was titled On the Prob-
lem of Method in the Psychology of Thinking and it had
more to do with the methodology of science than psy-
chology. Popper characterized it as a “hasty last minute
affair” [22, p. 78]. By the time he began work in earnest
on Logik der Forschung in the early 1930’s, Popper had
educated himself on the new quantum mechanics, by then
becoming accepted as a major advance in atomic physics.
Consistent with his interest in the logic and methodol-
ogy of science, Popper focused his study on the philosoph-
ical underpinnings of the new theory. He was especially
interested in the disputes that had arisen over how to inter-
pret physically the mathematical formalism of the theory.
Popper explains:
At the time (1930) when . . . I began writing my
book, modern physics was in turmoil. Quan-
tum mechanics had been created by Werner
Heisenberg in 1925, but it was several more
years before outsiders – including professional
physicists – realized that a major breakthrough
had been achieved. And from the very begin-
ning there was dissension and confusion. The
two greatest physicists, Einstein and Bohr, per-
haps the two greatest thinkers of the twentieth
century, disagreed with one another. [22, pp.
90-91]
Lacking doctoral-level knowledge of physics, Popper
struggled to grasp the new theory:
I was working on my own from books and from
articles; the only physicist with whom I some-
times talked about my difficulties was my friend
Franz Urbach. I tried to understand the theory
and he had doubts whether it was understand-
able – at least by ordinary mortals. [22, p. 91].
Eventually Popper came to appreciate the core of the dis-
agreement within physics and was able to sort out in his
mind the various positions of Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg,
Schro¨dinger, and Born. By the time Logik Der Forschung
was well underway, Popper felt qualified to address quan-
tum theory in the book.
Never one to tackle a subject halfway, Popper devoted
all of Chapter IX of Logik Der Forschung to Some Obser-
vations on Quantum Theory [23]. In the English transla-
tion, it runs to 35 densely-argued pages wherein Popper
sets out the views he was to maintain, with some modifi-
cations, for the rest of his life [24]. He makes his purpose
clear in the introductory section:
What follows here might be described, perhaps,
as an inquiry into the foundations of quantum
theory. In this, I shall avoid all mathematical
arguments and, with one single exception, all
mathematical formulae. This is possible be-
cause I shall not question the correctness of the
system of mathematical formulae of quantum
theory. I shall only be concerned with the logi-
cal consequences of its physical interpretation
which is due to [Max] Born. [24, p. 216]
Thereafter Popper lays out his criticism of what is com-
monly called the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum
theory (largely the work of Bohr) and the position of
Heisenberg that the uncertainty relations must be viewed
subjectively, as a “limitation of our knowledge” of phys-
ical systems [24, p. 220]. In the same passage, Popper
notes that Moritz Schlick of the Vienna Circle had ex-
pressed strong support for Heisenberg’s views (Heisen-
berg’s explication of his own position can be found in
[25]).
Popper devotes the next several sections to advocacy
of a statistical interpretation of the uncertainty relations.
He argues that, contra Heisenberg, it does indeed make
sense to attribute well-defined positions and momenta to
individual particles. Experimental results showing wave-
like behavior of particles (as in slit experiments) can be
explained as “statistical scatter relations.” The scattering
behavior is calculated using the mathematical machin-
ery of quantum theory, but it does not imply anything
about limitations on knowledge or an actual lack of a
well-defined position and momentum at any moment in
time [24, p. 225].
With this interpretation in hand, Popper wonders aloud
whether anything has in fact been gained. His conclusion
emphasizes his aim, which is in essence to succeed where
Einstein had failed in his arguments with Bohr:
The statistical elements of quantum theory must
be inter-subjectively testable in the same way
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as any other statements of physics. And my
simple analysis preserves not only the possibil-
ity of spatio-temporal descriptions, but also the
objective character of physics. [24, p. 234]
Events that took place two years after the publication sug-
gested to Popper that he should have ended the chapter
there. But he did not. In the next sections of the chapter,
Popper describes an imaginary experiment (Gedankenex-
periment) “which shows, in full agreement with quantum
theory, that the precise measurements in question are pos-
sible” [24, p. 243]. I will omit details of the experimental
design here – suffice to say that it had the same idea as
later versions, but was flawed in several key respects.
These flaws were made apparent to Popper at a scien-
tific conference held in Copenhagen in 1936. Following
the conference, Popper was invited by Bohr at the urging
of Victor Weiskopf, a leading theoretician, to stay on a few
days to discuss quantum mechanics. Popper was already
feeling uneasy about his Gedankenexperiment, which had
been questioned by Einstein. After discussions with Bohr,
Popper accepted that the experiment did not show what he
intended, and he left Copenhagen quite upset over losing
the argument [22, pp. 92-93]. While he did not stop think-
ing about quantum mechanics, he “remained for years
greatly discouraged . . . I could not get over my mistaken
thought experiment” [22, p. 94]. But following consul-
tations with physicist Arthur March in the late 1940’s,
Popper returned to the problems of quantum mechan-
ics with “something like renewed courage” [22, p. 94].
He began to revise and clarify his ideas while working
on a set of appendices for the English version of Logik
Der Forschung and the long-delayed Postscript. (The
Postscript actually appears several years before the En-
glish edition of the book with its new appendices. Here
I consider the appendices first in order to conclude the
discussion of Logik Der Forschung.)
Appendix xi of the English version of Logik Der
Forschung offers some general thoughts on the use of
imaginary experiments in physics (see also [26, pp. 240-
265]) before moving to a lengthy discussion of the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment and Bohr’s
interpretation of it, which Popper predictably rejects. In
Appendix xii, Popper bites the bullet and reprints in full
Einstein’s letter to him of 1935, in which Einstein de-
scribes the flaws in the Gedankenexperiment proposed in
Logik Der Forschung. Popper admits that Einstein’s letter
“briefly and decisively disposes of my imaginary experi-
ment in section 77” of Logik Der Forschung [24, p. 457].
By this time, however, Popper had already proposed a
new experiment in the Postscript to Logik Der Forschung,
and it is to that work that I now turn.
3 ‘Postscript to Logik Der
Forschung’: thoughts on
Gedankenexperiments
Popper’s Postscript evolved by the mid-1950s into a mas-
sive work that outsized the work it was a postscript to, so
large that it had to be published in three volumes [27–29].
Popper’s determination to have an impact on quantum
theory is evidenced by his devoting the entire third vol-
ume to the subject. If Quantum Theory and the Schism
in Physics [29] shows nothing else, it is proof that in the
twenty years since his embarrassment before Bohr, he had
devoted immense effort to mastering quantum mechanics.
The book covers a wide range of quantum theoretical
controversies and points of view, with a continual mixing
of physical, mathematical, and philosophical ideas.
To explore this work fully is beyond my present scope.
(This work appeared first in 1956, but again in a new
(and more easily obtainable) version in 1982. The 1982
version, which in many ways represents Popper’s final
statement of views on quantum theory, opens with a 35-
page Preface written in 1982, followed by a 62-page
chapter written as a paper in 1966! The 1956 volume
entitled Schism actually begins at page 97 of the 1982 edi-
tion. So the 1982 edition actually reads backwards from
1982 to 1956. In this section I confine the discussion to
the 1956 material.) For the moment I wish to focus on
Popper’s revisiting of the idea of an experimentum crucis.
As to the imaginary experiment proposed in Logik Der
Forschung, Popper states bluntly that it was “invalid, and
I wish to withdraw it” [29, p. 98]. In Chapter III, he
discusses first the relatively simple experiment of colli-
mated particles aimed at a small slit in a barrier. Classical
mechanics would say that the particles will travel straight
through, while quantum theory demands that if the slit is
small enough, a scattering effect will be achieved. This
scattering effect is due, according to Heisenberg, to the
confinement of the wave packet representing the particle
to a distance ∆x (the width of the slit), causing according
to the uncertainty relations a corresponding uncertainty
in the momentum ∆p, where ∆x∆p ≥ ~ [25, pp. 23-24].
But where Heisenberg (and Bohr) interpreted this result
(which is easily observable) as amounting to a denial of
a scattered particle’s “particality,” so to speak, so that
retrodictive calculation of the particle’s path is essentially
meaningless, Popper argues that one can conclude no
such thing. In his view, each scattered particle had a real
path and had a well-defined position and momentum at
all times. It was simply scattered by the slit: no episte-
mological conclusions can be drawn beyond that [29, pp.
144-147]. Popper then proceeds to examine the arguments
based on the celebrated Gedankenexperiment proposed by
Quanta | DOI: 10.12743/quanta.v1i1.4 November 2012 | Volume 1 | Issue 1 | Page 3
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, forever thereafter known
as the EPR experiment [30].
After a discussion of the conflicting points of view of
Einstein and Bohr – with interjections on why he agrees
with Einstein – Popper does not mince words on what he
believes is at stake:
Reasonableness was the point at issue. The
question is not whether by a subtle and highly
scholastic argument we may continue to up-
hold an untenable position. The question is
whether we should think critically and ratio-
nally in physics, or defensively and apologeti-
cally. [29, p. 150]
It is fairly apparent who Popper believes is doing the crit-
ical thinking and who is being defensive and apologetic.
Finally, Popper turns to an experiment analyzed (us-
ing classical wave theory) by Thomas Young in the early
1800’s and, according to Popper, “discussed again and
again by Bohr” [29, p. 151]. This is a two-slit experiment,
in which the quantum scattering induced by one slit is
then “projected” onto another barrier with two slits in it,
neither of which aligns with the slit in the first barrier.
What will then be observed, again assuming that all the
slits are small enough to engage quantum phenomena, is
an interference pattern just as if the whole experiment
were conducted with macroscopic waves on a pond. But
because we are using discrete particles, and each parti-
cle can go through only one of the two secondary slits,
it appears that the two slits cooperate in producing the
interference pattern. Indeed, closing one or the other of
the paired slits changes the final pattern.
Popper uses this experiment as an opportunity to ap-
ply his propensity interpretation of probability calcula-
tions. Where Bohr would say that the result in each
case (all slits open, two open, etc.) can be explained
only be recourse to the complementary notions of wave
and particle along with considering the active role of the
observer, Popper argues that “it is the whole experimen-
tal arrangement which determines the propensities.” By
‘propensities’ here, Popper refers to his interpretation of
probability, which differs from the more commonly-held
view that probability is statistical in nature. In Popper’s
view, probability is more akin to a field of force than it
is to a mathematically-calculated frequency. It therefore
acquires a ‘reality’ which can have physical effects: the
probability fields can interact and interfere with one an-
other. This approach, which Popper modified and refined
over the years, responds to Einstein’s dictum that ‘God
does not play dice’, and tends to restore some measure
of determinacy to physics that the standard versions of
quantum theory deny. (Popper’s approach to probability,
especially as it is used in physics, is discussed at various
points throughout [29]; see also [31, pp. 59-60] [3, pp.
109-112]. A recent paper compares Popper’s view on
propensities with those originally suggested by the Amer-
ican philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce [32].) I mention
the Young experiment, especially the aspect of closing
one of the paired slits, because it appears to be a precur-
sor in Popper’s mind of a modified two-slit experiment
he will propose and defend from 1981 to 1987. This
new experimental proposal is the subject of the next sec-
tion. I have found no evidence that Popper’s 1956 efforts
in the Postscript generated any interest in the physics
community. Most likely, the Postscript was read by few
physicists.
4 Gedankenexperiment
refinements, 1981-1987
Popper’s solitary efforts to offer a different view of quan-
tum phenomena acquire a different status in the early
1980’s. By this time, he had acquired colleagues in the
theoretical physics community, one of whom, French
physicist Jean-Pierre Vigier, had an international reputa-
tion. This collaboration led to the publication of a paper
in a widely-read English-language journal, Physics Let-
ters, in December of 1981 [33]. Italian physicist Augusto
Garuccio, K. Popper and J.-P. Vigier (GPV) jointly pro-
posed an experiment involving the interference of laser
beams. The intent of the paper is clearly stated in the
opening paragraph and rather obviously drafted by Pop-
per:
The present letter develops a gedanken experi-
ment which leads to conflicting testable predic-
tions of the Copenhagen . . . and causal statisti-
cal . . . interpretations of quantum theory. [33, p.
397]
It is not clear why the term “gedanken” is used here, since
the experiment was clearly within the range of 1981 tech-
nology. Perhaps the term is used only to make clear that
they had not built the apparatus and showed that it could
perform as predicted. The GPV experimental design was
based on work done by two other physicists, L. Man-
del and R. L. Pfleegor, in the late 1960’s, and modified
an experiment first proposed by Garuccio and Vigier in
1980. Popper and his co-authors acknowledge helpful
comments not only from Mandel, but also from John
S. Bell, who derived the famous Bell’s inequalities, and
Alain Aspect, who was at that time (1981) conducting
experiments of his own to test Bell’s inequalities. The
paper’s concluding assertions include a comment on de-
marcation that must surely have been Popper’s:
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As one knows this typical Copenhagen retroac-
tive action (which has been used to justify para-
psychological phenomena) raises trouble with
energy conservation and implies rejection of
Feynman’s quantum propagator Dc. The au-
thors feel with Einstein that: (I) the flow of time
is a real, irreversible and one-dimensional phe-
nomenon, (II) only positive energies move in
the forward time direction, and (III) the appar-
ent microscopic time reversibility of the quan-
tum mechanical wave equations only reflects
the particle/anti-particle mixture of Einstein
and Feynman which leads to correct perturba-
tion theory. [33, p. 400]
More or less coincident with the publication of this pa-
per, Popper re-issued Quantum Theory and the Schism in
Physics with a new Preface, On a Realistic and Common-
sense Interpretation of Quantum Theory and a new first
section, Quantum Mechanics Without ‘The Observer’ [29,
pp. 1-96]. Towards the end of the Preface, Popper pro-
poses “a simple thought experiment which may be re-
garded as an extension of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
argument.” Oddly, this experiment (though in this case
admittedly a thought experiment, as no apparatus is actu-
ally described) is not at all the same as in the paper with
Vigier and Garuccio, though the underlying purpose is the
same. This experiment involved the placing of an emis-
sion source between two slits. The source emits particles
with equal and opposite momenta (Figure 1). The parti-
cles pass through the small slits and scatter according to
the uncertainty relations. But what would happen, Popper
asks (and here is where the centuries-old Young optics
experiment may have played a role), to the observed scat-
tering on one side if the slit on the other side is widened
so that by itself it would cause no quantum scattering?
Will the “knowledge” imparted by the confinement of
the particle in the still-small slit induce scattering on the
other side so that the observed pattern does not change?
As Popper explains:
To sum up: if the Copenhagen interpretation
is correct, then any increase in the precision of
our mere knowledge of the position qy of the
particles going to the right should increase their
scatter; and this prediction should be testable.
[29, p. 29]
The paper in Physics Letters drew immediate attention
in the physics community. First to respond was French
physicist O. Costa de Beauregard, who offered in May of
1982 a brief letter entitled Disagreement with Garuccio,
Popper and Vigier [34]. De Beauregard had no appar-
ent objections to the experimental design of GPV but
argued that the results would be fully consistent with the
standard interpretations of quantum theory. He admits,
however, that his remarks “contain no objection against
the tentative theory of Garuccio et al.” Just a few weeks
later, Mandel criticized GPV’s experimental arrangement
and offered a modification of the design that would in
principle address his objections [35]. The next month,
June 1982, Garuccio and Vigier entered another paper
in Physics Letters, but in this case Popper’s place as a
co-author was taken by one of Garuccio’s colleagues, V.
Rapisarda [36]. That Popper remains involved is made
clear by note 4 in this paper, which cites a “private com-
munication” from Popper. These authors noted that the
GPV paper had “provoked a complex and heated discus-
sion” in the physics community. Their present purpose
was to
. . . present an experimental programme and ex-
perimental set-up which clearly falls outside of
the field of the above-mentioned objections to
the preceding discussion [GPV] and suppresses,
as far as possible, experimental difficulties. [36,
p. 17]
At the end of the paper, the authors asserted that this
experiment will “escape all preceding objections” and,
if conducted, “would really constitute a crucial distinc-
tion between CIQM [the Copenhagen Interpretation] and
reality.”
There the matter lay until 1985. In that year, a paper by
Anthony Sudbery, a mathematician at the University of
York, appeared in Philosophy of Science [37]. Sudbery’s
critical stance can be discerned from his lengthy title:
Popper’s Variant of the EPR Experiment Does Not Test
the Copenhagen Interpretation. Sudbery analyzed the
version of the experiment Popper presented in the 1982
Preface to Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics,
and in fact made no mention at all of the 1982 papers in
Physics Letters. Sudbery criticizes two features of the
thought experiment:
The essential elements of [Popper’s] deduction
are: (i) the inverse relation between ∆y and
∆py, the uncertainties in position and momen-
tum; and (ii) the correlation between the posi-
tions of two particles that have interacted in the
past. Neither of these is universally true, what-
ever interpretation of quantum mechanics is in
question; each of them holds only in special
circumstances. According to the Copenhagen
interpretation, they do not hold simultaneously;
hence Popper’s deduction of the effect E [in-
crease in momentum spread] is not valid within
this interpretation. [37, p. 472]
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Figure 1: Schematic diagram of Popper’s thought experiment. (a) When both slits A and B are present, the particles are expected
to show scatter in momentum. (b) Popper believed that by removing slit B one could test the Copenhagen interpretation.
As to (i), Sudbery points out that the inverse relation
(i.e., the Heisenberg relation) is not an equality but an
inequality. Using the entangled wave function employed
by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (the EPR wave func-
tion), application of the inequality leads to the possibility
that the uncertainties in the positions and momenta of
the entangled particles is in fact infinite. In such a case,
Sudbery argues, “narrowing slit A has no effect on the
range of momenta of the particles at either A or B, since
these ranges cannot be increased any further”. On ele-
ment (ii), Sudbery argues that the experimental apparatus
used to measure the entangled particles after separation,
by the Copenhagen interpretation, disturbs the initial cor-
relations between positions and momenta. Hence the
wave function being measured is not the EPR function
describing the initial state, which Sudbery writes in the
form:
ψ(rA, rB) = φ1(xA)φ2(xB)δ(yA − yB) (1)
where φ1 and φ2 are separated localized wave packets,
but a different wave function in which the correlations are
no longer present:
ψ′(rA, rB) = φ1(xA)φ2(xB) (2)
He summarizes as follows:
If the particles approach the slits in the EPR
wave function, so that the observation of one
particle gives information about the other, then
the spread of the counters that register particles
do not depend on the width of the slit. Con-
versely, if the experiment is arranged so that the
spread of counters does depend on the width of
the slit, the observation of one particle gives no
information about the other. [37, p. 473]
Although some researchers have rejected Sudbery’s logic
and conclusions [38], in his recent paper, Qureshi [20]
finds that Sudbery’s argument on (i) above “is the only
robust criticism of Popper’s experiment”.
That Popper’s views were not universally rejected, how-
ever, is made apparent in the 1985 text Open Questions
in Quantum Physics, based on the proceedings of a con-
ference held in 1983 at the University of Bari, Italy [39].
Popper’s contribution, Realism in Quantum Mechanics
and a New Version of the EPR Experiment [40] appears
first in the book, and is followed by a discussion among
Popper, Vigier, and nine other physicists [39, pp. 26-32].
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Popper’s essay in this book represents, in my view, the
culmination of his thinking on quantum theory and its
relationship to scientific realism and human knowledge.
In the opening paragraphs, he comments:
I am a realist, and I believe in the reality of mat-
ter, or energy, of particles, of fields of forces,
of wavelike disturbances of these fields, and
of propensity fields (de Broglie fields) . . . and
I suggest that quantum mechanics is misinter-
preted when it is not interpreted realistically. I
also suggest that quantum mechanics says noth-
ing whatever about epistemology, about our
knowledge and its limits, no more than Newto-
nian dynamics. [40, p. 4]
Contrast this view with that of Heisenberg, one of Pop-
per’s epistemological nemeses. In describing the meaning
of the uncertainty relations as applied to the position and
momentum of a free electron following a precise mea-
surement of its velocity and no measurement at all of
position:
Then the principle states that every subsequent
observation of the position will alter the mo-
mentum by an unknown and indeterminable
amount such that after carrying out the exper-
iment our knowledge of the electronic motion
is restricted by the uncertainty relation . . . It
is a matter of personal belief whether [back-
calculation of] the past history of the electron
can be ascribed any physical reality or not. [25,
p. 20]
Bohr, the other principal target of Popper’s criticism, ar-
gued to the same effect:
Indeed we have in each experimental arrange-
ment suited for the study of proper quantum
phenomena not merely to do with an ignorance
of the value of certain physical quantities, but
with the impossibility of defining these quanti-
ties in an unambiguous way. [41, p. 699]
A few pages into the essay, Popper characteristically joins
the issue without hesitation; he has come a long way from
the embarrassment of the Logik experiment:
[This leads to] the doctrine that the Heisenberg
formulae ∆px∆qx ≥ h2pi etc. are about limits to
human knowledge or to the precision of pos-
sible measurements on particles. This Copen-
hagen thesis I deny. As a realist I assert that
the formula is about the lower limits on the
scatter of particles . . . The particles themselves
possess sharp positions and, at the same time,
sharp momenta. [40, p. 4-5]
The discussion following Popper’s essay was spirited and
focused almost entirely on Popper’s proposed experiment,
which in this essay is the same as the experiment proposed
in the Postscript, i.e., particles with correlated momentum
states passing through slits. Some participants doubted it
could be conducted, others argued over what the results
(one way or the other) might mean. Gino Tarozzi, one
of the conference organizers, was strongly in favor of
conducting the experiment, commenting that in his view
the experiment would be an effective test of “Einstein
locality versus Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations” [39,
p. 30].
Popper’s final contributions to the interpretation of
quantum mechanics appeared in the pages of Letters to
Nature in 1987 [42, 43]. Two physicists at Essex Univer-
sity, M. J. Collett and R. Loudon, had taken the position
that Popper’s 1982 Postscript experiment “does not in fact
provide a test” of the Copenhagen Interpretation [44, 45].
They argued that the source (say positronium) must be
assigned a finite uncertainty in both position and mo-
mentum; calculation of this “source uncertainty effect”
showed, in their view, that experiment was not a valid
test of the Copenhagen interpretation. Popper, now 85
years old, replied to the letter a few months later. He
began by thanking Collett and Loudon for “opening up a
discussion of my 1982 proposal . . . an experiment based
upon Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen and a radical simpli-
fication of another proposal by myself,” a reference to
the ill-fated Logik experiment [42]. Popper answered the
physicists’ arguments point for point, and corrected their
impression that his experiment was a test of quantum
mechanics itself:
My experiment was never intended as a cru-
cial experiment of quantum mechanics but only
of its (subjectivist) Copenhagen interpretation
(which they call “the standard interpretation”).
[42]
Popper pointed out that there “exist several interpretations
of the formalism” and provided a citation to one devel-
oped by Jon Dorling. (Indeed, work continues along the
lines Popper advocated, i.e., a statistical interpretation of
quantum mechanics and especially of the uncertainty rela-
tions. See, for example, [46], the abstract of which begins:
“I attempt to develop further the statistical interpretation of
quantum mechanics proposed by Einstein, developed by
Popper, Ballentine, etc.”) Collett and Loudon’s reply to
this letter followed immediately after Popper’s letter; they
simply do not agree [45]. Popper insisted in characteristic
fashion on having the last word. In a short note in Letters
to Nature a month later, he first corrected a rather obvious
error in the printing of his previous letter [43]. Then he
took one last jab at Collett and Loudon’s position:
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I would point out that in their original criticism
they speak of a “fixed source”, whereas in their
new criticism they replace this by a “massive
source.” To my mind this means a change of
the problem: they never explain why a (non-
massive positronium) source cannot be “fixed.”
[43]
Popper died in 1994, and thereafter, one might expect,
his Gedankenexperiment would draw no further notice.
Indeed, that was the case for more than a decade after
1987. But in 1999, Popper returned to the pages of the
physics journals, and in a most surprising way.
5 Shih and Kim, 1999, and
aftermath
In 1999, University of Maryland physicists Yanhua Shih
and Yoon-Ho Kim reported the results of a realization of
Popper’s experiment [13–15]. Their experimental setup
did not use Popper’s point particle source (such as a decay
of positronium) – it used entangled photons produced by a
laser and refracted by lenses through slits (Figure 2). This
arrangement avoided the “Sudbery problem” of the inabil-
ity to eliminate uncertainty effects in the initial position
of a particle. Shih and Kim point out that
. . . a point source is not a necessary requirement
for Popper’s experiment. What is needed is the
position entanglement of a two-particle system,
i.e., if the position of particle 1 is precisely
known, the position of particle 2 is also 100%
determined. [14, p. 466]
Their results, taken at face value, “show that there appears
to be a violation of the uncertainty principle” [14, p. 463].
This would mean, from Popper’s point of view, that the
Copenhagen interpretation is in error.
But Shih and Kim do not take that position. Instead,
they argue that it is impermissible to apply the uncertainty
relations to each of the entangled-state photons separately.
These photons are, in their view, represented by a “non-
factorizeable two-dimensional wave packet” such that
“∆y∆py ≥ ~ is not applicable to either photon 1 or photon
2 individually.” They conclude:
Our experimental demonstration of Popper’s
thought experiment call (sic) our attention to
the important message: the physics of an entan-
gled two-particle system is inherently different
from that of two individual particles. [14, p.
470]
It is of interest that among the physicists whose assistance
is acknowledged are none other than Jean-Pierre Vigier
and Augusto Garuccio, Popper’s 1981 collaborators [14,
p. 470].
Shih and Kim’s paper generated a cloudburst of re-
sponses, comments, criticisms, and suggestions for fur-
ther work [8–12, 16, 17, 47–53]. The positions taken vary
from Asher Peres’s ungracious reference to “the absur-
dity of Popper’s result” [49, p. 23] to Geoffrey Hunter’s
affirmation that
Popper and EPR made no error – they agreed
with Bohr, Heisenberg and other proponents
of the Copenhagen interpretation that quantum
theory predicts an instantaneous action at a dis-
tance . . . Popper and EPR’s crucial point is that
if such actions at a distance are not in fact ob-
served (as in the Shih-Kim experiment), then
quantum theory must be an incomplete (only
statistical) theory of the physical world . . . [8, p.
248]
Rainer Plaga suggested an improvement (“Extension Step
1”) in the Shih-Kim experiment that addresses a “concep-
tual flaw” having to do with the role of the observer [11].
In Plaga’s opinion
. . . it is of great importance to actually perform
Popper’s experiment with “Extension Step 1”
. . . Should an experimental realization of “Ex-
tension Step 1” show that no virtual diffraction
occurs, the relation between “quantum mechan-
ical state” and “observed reality” . . . would be
put into doubt. [11, p. 471]
A. J. Short agreed with Shih and Kim that their results do
not suggest a violation of the uncertainty principle, but
for different theoretical reasons [47, 48], while Brazilian
physicist G. Rigolin disagreed with Short and claimed to
“invalidate” his analysis [50]. A Korean group suggested
a realization of Popper’s experiment using a “dual mea-
surement scheme” to achieve a modern version of Heisen-
berg’s microscope thought experiment [10]. From Spain
comes theoretician Pedro Sancho’s application of Feyn-
man’s path integral methods to the Shih-Kim results [12].
And from one of India’s leading theoreticians, C. S. Un-
nikrishnan, no less than three papers (all published since
2000) on many aspects of EPR, Popper’s experiment, and
the Shih-Kim results [51–53]. In addition to this spate
of papers, Popper’s experiment is analyzed in a recent
textbook by Alexander Afriat and Franco Selleri devoted
entirely to the EPR paradox [21] (published just slightly
before Shih and Kim announced their results in 1999).
The authors, both long-time contributors in the field, point
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Figure 2: Modified version of Popper’s experiment. An EPR photon pair is generated by spontaneous parametric down-
conversion in a barium borate (BBO) crystal. A lens and a narrow slit A are placed in the path of photon 1 to provide the precise
knowledge of its position on the y-axis and also determine the precise y-position of its twin, photon 2, on screen B due to a
‘ghost image’ effect. The distance between the lens and each of the slits is adjusted to 2 f , where f is the focal length of the lens.
Two detectors D1 and D2 are used to scan in the y-directions for coincidence counts. (a) Slits A and B are adjusted both very
narrowly. (b) Slit A is kept very narrow and slit B is removed.
out the initial momentum problem in Popper’s original
proposal, but also note that the experiment could in prin-
ciple be conducted by the use of collinear particles or
photons [21, pp. 238-242].
6 Realism, uncertainty, knowledge
In this final section, I wish to explore the question: what
nerve did Popper strike in his persistent challenge to the
Copenhagen interpretation? What motivates physicists to
devote time and resources to attempt Popper’s experiment
and battle over the meaning of the results?
To Popper, the interpretation of quantum mechanics
represented a demarcational issue, not between science
and non-science, but between the physical reality of
things and human knowledge of those things. Popper read
Bohr and Heisenberg as suggesting that “mere knowledge”
of things had an observable physical effect, and to Popper
this was nearing something like belief in the paranormal.
He could not accept mixing ontology and epistemology
in this way [54]. Things exist, and we can come to know
them by conjectures and refutations – but what we know
(or think we know) and what is are not causally connected.
Ontology remains prior to epistemology.
But more than realism was at stake. Popper tells us in
the opening pages of Schism that his “strongest reason for
my own opposition to the Copenhagen interpretation lies
in its claim to finality and completeness” [29, pp. 5-6].
This statement calls to mind the 1935 dispute between
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen on the one hand, and Niels
Bohr on the other. The Einstein paper concludes:
While we have thus shown that the wave func-
tion does not provide a complete description of
physical reality, we left open the question of
whether or not such a description exists. [30, p.
780]
Bohr’s responding paper certainly appears to lay a claim
to finality and completeness:
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Such an argumentation [EPR], however, would
hardly seem suited to affect the soundness
of quantum-mechanical description, which is
based on a coherent formalism covering auto-
matically any procedure of measurement like
that indicated. [41, p. 696]
To Popper, this argument must have seemed like a contest
between the critical, questioning posture he developed in
Logik Der Forschung, and a position bordering on pure
empiricism: we can know no more than what we see,
and what we can know limits what exists. Philosopher
Michael Redhead (who both met and corresponded with
Popper) explains that in Popper’s view, “probabilities in
physics cannot, in general, be epistemic. How could hu-
man ignorance produce genuine physical effects?” [55, p.
172]. Popper designed and promoted “his experiment”
not so much to prove quantum mechanics wrong, as to
restore the “conjectures and refutations” attitude in quan-
tum theory. To Popper, a physicist arguing that his theory
is final and complete was anathema.
Perhaps most of the physicists who are once again
engaged in a debate over ‘Popper’s experiment’ are not
overly concerned, as he was, with the nature of valid
scientific inquiry. That is not terribly important. What
is important is that Popper continues, from beyond the
grave, to prick the “standard interpretation” of quantum
mechanics and in so doing unsettles the field enough to
generate renewed debate. One can hardly improve on
Redhead’s appreciation of Popper’s contribution:
Popper fought a lone battle against the Copen-
hagen interpretation at a time when anyone at-
tempting to criticize orthodoxy was liable to
be labeled at best an ‘outsider’ or at worst a
crank. But Popper’s carefully argued criticisms
won the support of a number of admiring and
influential physicists. He has done a great ser-
vice to the philosophy of quantum mechanics
by emphasizing the distinction between state
preparation and measurement and trying to get
a clearer understanding of the true significance
of the uncertainty principle, but above all by
spearheading the resistance to the dogmatic
tranquilizing philosophy of the Copenhagenists.
Because some detailed arguments are flawed,
this does not mean that his overall influence has
not been abundantly beneficial. [55, p. 176]
I believe that if Popper could once again weigh in on
the debate – and weigh in he surely would! – he would
demand above all else that the arguments continue, that
more experiments be conducted, conjectures offered and
refutations put forward. True, he would hope for a result
that showed human knowledge has nothing whatever to
do with the position and momentum of particles. Yet
even if the result seemed to show otherwise, he would
continue to look for ways to preserve scientific realism
and objectivity. What he could not abide was any hint of
smugness, a complacency that our knowledge is complete
and critical inquiry is at an end.
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